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SARS Transmission
and Commercial
Aircraft
To the Editor: Severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS) is an emerg-
ing transmissible disease first report-
ed in Asia in February 2003. The dis-
ease is characterized by acute onset of
fever with nonproductive cough,
myalgia, shortness of breath, or diffi-
culty breathing (1). Approximately
14% of case-patients require mechan-
ical ventilation (1,2). The syndrome is
caused by the previously unrecog-
nized SARS-associated coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) (3). The primary mode
of SARS transmission is through
close person-to-person contact. In
March 2003, the World Health
Organization (WHO) issued two trav-
el advisories to SARS-affected coun-
tries. Despite these advisories, proba-
ble case-patients traveled by air inter-
nationally, thereby spreading the dis-
ease globally. The extent of risk posed
by probable cases for in-flight trans-
mission of SARS is unclear. 
A study was conducted by the
Robert Koch Institute in Berlin,
Germany, to document SARS trans-
mission during international flights.
On April 11, 2003, the Institute was
notified that a probable SARS-infect-
ed person had flown from Hong Kong
to Frankfurt, Germany, on March 30
to 31, 2003, and then traveled exten-
sively in Europe after onset of symp-
toms. In 5 days, the traveler, a 48-
year-old Hong Kong businessman,
had flown on seven flights throughout
Europe (Table). On March 31, symp-
toms of SARS, including fever and
general malaise developed; whether
he had a cough at this time is unclear.
He was admitted to a hospital in Hong
Kong on April 8, and mechanical ven-
tilation was initiated. He was reported
to WHO as a suspected SARS patient
on April 9 and diagnosed with SARS
on April 10. Polymerase chain reac-
tion analysis conducted on the
patient’s nasopharyngeal aspirate
showed positive results for SARS-
CoV on April 14.
Passenger manifests from the
seven flights on which the patient had
flown were requested by the local
health departments and the Institute.
In a previous study, Kenyon et al. indi-
cated that airline passengers seated
within two rows of an infectious tuber-
culosis patient were at greatest risk for
infection (4). To determine an associa-
tion between seating proximity to the
SARS patient and transmission of
SARS, a study that included all airline
passengers seated within four rows
(i.e., front, back, and same row) of the
index patient (4) was conducted.
Passengers ≥18 years of age who lived
in Germany were contacted by the
Institute and asked to participate in the
study; all participants gave informed
consent for inclusion in the study.
Passengers in other countries were not
included in the study because contact
information was not available.
Passengers <18 years of age were not
included in the study; ethical approval
from an Institutional Review Board,
which would have delayed the study,
would have been necessary. Contact
information for study participants was
forwarded to local health departments
so that public health officials could
provide follow-up care. Study partici-
pants were interviewed approximately
3 months after their flights because
contact information was not available
earlier. A standardized questionnaire
was developed to collect information
on demographics, flight details, coun-
tries visited before the flights, use of
mask, and symptoms. Furthermore,
5–10 mL of whole blood was drawn
and tested for SARS-CoV antibodies
by using immunofluorescence assay. 
A total of 250 passengers were
identified and selected for the study.
Contact information was available for
109 passengers; 69 of the 109 were
living in Germany. Sixty-two of those
69 passengers were contacted, and 41
passengers agreed to participate in the
study. Thirty-six participants complet-
ed questionnaires and had blood sam-
ples taken. The male-to-female ratio
was 3:5, and the median age was 41
years (25–59 years). Contact informa-
tion was not available for five passen-
gers, which made their inclusion in the
study impossible. All serologic sam-
ples (N = 36) tested were negative for
SARS-CoV immunoglobulin G anti-
bodies, and none of the 36 passengers
reported symptoms characteristic of
SARS. Ten passengers complained of
cough, headache, and muscle aches.
One passenger reported a cough, mus-
cle aches, and fever, but symptoms
started 10 days after the flight. An
analysis of the seating arrangement
showed that the study participants
were randomly distributed around the
index patient.
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Table. Flight itinerary of SARS patient
a 
Departure city  Arrival city  Date/time departure   Date/time arrival   Duration (h:min)  
Hong Kong  Frankfurt  March 30/23:10  March 31/05:35  12:25 
Frankfurt  Barcelona  March 31/09:05  March 31/11:10  2:05 
Onset of symptoms  after arrival  in Barcelona on March 31, 2003  
Barcelona  Frankfurt  April 2/07:05  April 2/09:15  2:10 
Frankfurt  London  April 2/10:15  April 2/11:30  2:15 
London  Munich  April 3/15:25  April 3/18:10  1:45 
Munich  Frankfurt  April 4/14:50  April 4/16:00  1:10 
Frankfurt  Hong Kong  April 4/17:40  April 5/10:35  9:55 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.  LETTERS
No SARS transmission was shown
among contacted passengers seated in
close proximity to the index patient;
these results suggest that in-flight
transmission of SARS is not common.
These results are consistent with other
studies that assessed the risk for in-
flight transmission of SARS (5,6). The
results also suggest that SARS-CoV is
not efficiently transmitted, as reflected
in its basic reproduction number R0
(range 2–4) (7). The SARS-infected
patient on the indicated flights was in
his first week of illness; infectivity is
greatest in the second week (8).
Therefore, the likelihood of SARS
transmission on the indicated flights
was not high. These results are further
supported by the fact that all contacts
were asymptomatic 13 days after their
last contact with the SARS patient. No
information was available on health-
care contacts. Although we did not
observe any SARS transmission, we
cannot rule out the possibility that it
may have occurred. We had no contact
information on 56% of the passengers
on the indicated flights and, therefore,
had to exclude them from the investi-
gation. Obtaining complete contact
information from the remaining pas-
sengers was difficult, which severely
impeded the investigation. Similarly,
we were unable to contact crew mem-
bers and had to exclude them. Recent
studies have documented SARS trans-
mission to passengers seated more
than four rows away from an index
patient (5,9); thus, studying the pas-
senger proximity to the patient may
not be sufficient. Because of these lim-
itations, our final sample size was
small and probably biased. Since we
did not observe any evidence to indi-
cate in-flight transmission of SARS,
we were unable to assess the impor-
tance of seat assignment proximity as
a risk factor. 
The study shows that the roles of
public health authorities and the avia-
tion industry should be to “harmonise
the protection of public health without
the need to avoid unnecessary disrup-
tion of trade and travel” in public
health emergencies such as global
SARS transmission (10). We recom-
mend strengthening the collaboration
between national health authorities
and the airline industry. Furthermore,
the International Air Transport
Association should establish proce-
dures to ensure that complete contact
information is available for all pas-
sengers and that rapid notification can
be accomplished in case of potential
exposure to infectious diseases.
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Estimating SARS
Incubation Period
To the Editor: In a recent article,
Meltzer described a simulation
method to estimate the incubation
period for patients infected with
SARS with multiple contact dates (1).
In brief, he assumed a uniform distri-
bution of all possible incubation peri-
ods derived from these contact dates
for each patient and randomly select-
ed an incubation period from all con-
tact dates for each patient to obtain a
distribution of the incubation period
for all 19 patients. The process is
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